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Complex non-linear interactions between banks and assets we model by two time-dependent Erdo˝s
Renyi network models where each node, representing bank, can invest either to a single asset (model
I) or multiple assets (model II). We use dynamical network approach to evaluate the collective
financial failure—systemic risk—quantified by the fraction of active nodes. The systemic risk can
be calculated over any future time period, divided on sub-periods, where within each sub-period
banks may contiguously fail due to links to either (i) assets or (ii) other banks, controlled by two
parameters, probability of internal failure p and threshold Th (“solvency” parameter). The systemic
risk non-linearly increases with p and decreases with average network degree faster when all assets
are equally distributed across banks than if assets are randomly distributed. The more inactive
banks each bank can sustain (smaller Th), the smaller the systemic risk—for some Th values in I we
report a discontinuity in systemic risk. When contiguous spreading becomes stochastic (ii) controlled
by probability p2—a condition for the bank to be solvent (active) is stochastic—the systemic risk
decreases with decreasing p2. We analyse asset allocation for the U.S. banks.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Ey,89.90.+N
INTRODUCTION
Phase transitions, critical points, hystereses and
regime shifts are basic blocks describing the phase flip-
ping of a complex dynamical system between two or more
phases [1]. One of the systems having these properties
is the financial system that can be considered as a sys-
tem flipping over time between mainly stable phase, rep-
resenting good years, and mainly instable phase, repre-
senting bad years. In the financial system, the transition
from mainly stable to mainly instable phase can be trig-
gered either by an outside sudden event such as a war
or by a bankruptcy of a huge bank where the financial
contagion can spread due to interlinks between financial
units. The nature of this contagion spreading implies
that a network approach can be the best suitable frame-
work to describe not only financial contagion but also
financial crises [1–15]. In networks, just like in financial
systems, the existing nodes can be rewired, and new links
and nodes can be added and removed as time elapses and
node’s properties can change over time [16–22].
In seminal work on network approach in finance, Allen
and Gale [3] argued that a more interelated network may
help that the losses of a disstressed bank are shared
among more creditors reducing the impact of negative
∗Electronic address: bp@phy.hr
shocks to each individual bank. Using a network model
of epidemics where nework is characterized by its degree
distribution, Gai and Kapadia [9] showed that a large
rare shock may have different consequences depending on
where it hits in the network and what is the average de-
gree of the network. In contrast, beyond a certain point,
such interconnections may serve as a mechanism for prop-
agation of large shocks leading to a more fragile financial
system. Beale et al [10] focused on vulnerability of finan-
cial system, precisely on the friction of interest between
individual banks and entire economy. The authors inves-
tigated the relationship between the risk taken by indi-
vidual banks and the systemic risk associate with multi-
ple bank failures. Arinaminpathy, Kapadia and May [11]
reported how imposing tougher capital requirements on
larger banks than smaller ones can increase the resilience
of the financial system. Elliot, Golob, and Jackson [15]
reported how integration (each organization becoming
more dependent on its counterparties) and diversifica-
tions (each organization interacting with a larger num-
ber of counterparties) have different effects on cascading
failure. Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and A. Tahbaz-Salehi [13]
reported that financial contagion exhibits a phase tran-
sition as interbank connectivity increases. If shocks are
smaller than some threshold, more linked network en-
hance the stability of the system. However, for shocks
larger than the threshold, more linked network facilitate
financial contagion.
2RESULTS
The global financial crisis has urged the need for
analysing systemic risk representing the collective finan-
cial failure [1, 4, 7–12, 15]. The majority of literature
on systemic risk is focused on how the financial system
responds to the failure of a single bank. However, in
real finance many banks can fail inherently either simul-
taneusly or at different times. Here, in order to esti-
mate the collective financial failure when multiple initial
failures are possible occuring presumably at various mo-
ments, we model complex non-linear interaction between
banks and firms by two variants of the dynamical Erdo˝s
Renyi network proposed in Ref. [23], where nodes (banks)
contiguously fail due to links to both (i) assets and (ii)
other banks, and (iii) possibly recover. In Ref. [23], the
collective phenomena reported in a financial system—
phase transitions, critical points, hystereses and phase
flipping—have been described by the dynamical network
approach. It has been explained how the network, due
to (ii) stochastic contiguous spread among the nodes,
may lead to the spontaneous emergence of macroscopic
phase-flipping phenomena. In our dynamical network ap-
proach, bank i can internally fail at any moment ti, and
once it fails, the contagion spreads at ti+1 on i’s nearest
neighbours, at ti+2 on i’s second neighbours, and so on.
This approach allows us to calculate the systemic risk at
different future time horizons. The probability parame-
ter, controlling the macroscopic phase-flipping phenom-
ena [23], determines also that the condition for a bank to
be solvent (active) is not deterministic [9], but stochastic.
Qualitatively it is known that more links between
banks may reduce the risk of contagion [3]. Recently
a model of contagion in financial networks has been pro-
posed [9] where each bank i has interbank assets ABi ,
interbank liabilities LBi , deposits Di and illiquid assets
AMi , and the condition for the bank to be solvent (ac-
tive) is (1− φ)ABi +A
M
i −L
B
i −Di > 0—a bank’s assets
must ecxeed its liabilities—where φ is the fraction of inac-
tive neighbouring banks. To account for possibility that
many banks can fail at any moment—not only at ini-
tial moment—and to account for possibility to estimat-
ing bank risk for different future time horizons, highly
volatile financial networks in this work we model by a
variant of the dynamical Erdo˝s Renyi network [23]. We
define I in the following:
(i) nodes represent banks, and bank i at time t fails
if (1 − φt,i)A
B
i + A
M
t,i − L
B
i −Dt,i ≤ 0. The previ-
ous time-dependent condition can be accomplished
if (i) bank i internally fails randomly and indepen-
dently of other nodes with probability of failure p
(see Methods)—for each bank i, with probability p,
AMt,i −Dt,i becomes negative and i fails, regardless
of interbank assets.
(ii) Besides internally, in I bank i can also fail with
probability p2 if it has less than 100Th% active
neighbours (where i sets its interbank assets) [23,
24]. If not stated differently, here we assume that
p2 = 1, implying that if bank i has < 100Th% ac-
tive banks, it deterministically fails. The parameter
Th measures the robustness of bank network—the
smaller the parameter Th, the more robust the bank
network. Note that Th can be related with the cri-
terion for bank failures of Ref. [9]. To this end, let’s
assume that for each bank there is a linear depen-
dence between asset ABi and network degree k—e.g.
ABi = ki. Since the number of incoming and out-
going links is equal, it holds ABi = L
B
i . Expressing
AMi and Di at t = 0 as proportional to ki(A
B
i ),
when i active, say AMt=0,i = 0.6ki and Dt=0,i =
0.3ki, then bank i is inactive if φt,i ≥ 0.3 ≡ φh
(if at least 30% neighbouring banks are inactive, or
alternatively, if less than 70% neighbouring banks
are active). Thus,
1− Th = φh. (1)
(iii) In I after a time period τ , the nodes recover from
internal failure (see Methods). In finance, this τ is
comparable with an average time a firm spends in
financial distress that is approximately two years
for U.S. firms [25].
To calculate how the systemic risk—among many dif-
ferent definitions [14], here defined as the fraction of
failed banks—depends on the model parameters, first
we present an analytical result that holds for mean-
field approximation, which is generally valid for a net-
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FIG. 1: Dependence of network systemic risk of banks, 1−fn
(fraction of failed banks), on network parameters, individual
probability of bank failure p, threshold Th, and network de-
gree, 〈k〉. We use ER dynamical network of Ref. [23], where
banks fail independently of each other. (a)-(b) 1−fn increases
with p for varying Th and 〈k〉. (c) 1−fn non-continuously in-
creases with Th. (d) 1− fn decreases with 〈k〉 for large values
of 〈k〉.
3work with large number of nodes and degrees. If in-
ternal (X) and external (Y ) failures are independent,
Ref. [23] calculated the probability, a = a(p, p2, Th) ≡
P (X ∪ Y ), that a randomly chosen bank node i is in-
active a = p + p2(1 − p)ΣkP (k)E(k,m, a). This prob-
ability is equal to the fraction of inactive bank nodes,
a = 1 − 〈fn〉. Here P (k) is the degree distribution
of the inter-bank links, and parameters p, Th, and p2
are explained in I. E(k,m, a) ≡ Σmj=0a
k−j(1 − a)j
(
k
k−j
)
is the probability that node i’s neighbourhood is crit-
ically damaged [23], where k is the number of links
of node i, and m ≡ Thk. For m = 1 we provide
an analytical form of a = 1 − 〈fn〉 when P (k) is the
Poisson distribution P (k) = (〈k〉)ke−〈k〉/k!—we obtain
a = p+ p2(1− p)(1 + 〈k〉 − a〈k〉)e
〈k〉(a−1).
Application of analytical results based on mean field
approximation in finance—where generally there are ei-
ther small or moderately large number of banks—is
highly limited since for these cases the mean field holds
only approximately [23]. For these cases, in practice, nu-
merical approach helps us estimate how the systemic risk
quantitatively depends on each model parameters and fi-
nally enable us to, using regression, estimate what the
systemic risk is for a given set of empirically estimated
parameters.
For dynamical Erdo˝s Renyi network I with 1,000
banks, in numerical simulations each of 10,000 runs is
used to estimate e.g. the systemic risk a year ahead ex-
pressed as the fraction of failed banks, 1− fn. Each run
we accomplish in two time steps and each bank can in-
ternally fail in both time steps with no recovery (τ > 2).
By fixing parameters 〈k〉 and Th, in Fig. (1)(a)-(b) we
find that the bank systemic risk, 1 − fn, increases non-
linearly with individual bank failure p. In Fig. (1)(a)
the systemic risk decreases with the average degree 〈k〉.
Thus, the larger the number of links between banks, the
smaller the systemic risk. This result is in agreement
with Ref. [2] where it was shown that networks with more
links are less vulnerable than networks with a few links,
since the fraction of the losses in one bank is transferred
to more banks through interbank links. Note that our
choice 〈k〉 = 15 is due to Ref.[5] reporting that the aver-
age bank in the U.S. is linked to 15 others, however most
banks has only few connections while a small number of
huge banks have thousands.
In Fig. (1)(b) we report that the more failed neigh-
bouring banks any bank can sustain (the smaller Th),
the smaller the systemic risk. In economics, the exis-
tence of threshold assumes that when an organization’s
value (say asset minus debt) hits a failure threshold, the
organization discontinuosly can lose part of its value [15].
Due to interdependencies among nodes, individual failues
may trigger collective cascade of failures. To this end,
with increasing Th the systemic risk in Fig. (1)(c) ex-
hibits a non-linear discontinuity where 1 − fn suddenly
jumps at some critical points in Th such as 1/2, 2/3, ...,
since link values are integer numbers. Note that Ref. [23]
reported a discontinuity in the fraction of active nodes,
fn, when increasing (decreasing) p and p2, together with
the hysteresis property that is the characteristic feature
of a first-order phase transition [23, 24]. As stated in
Introduction, recently Ref. [13] reported phase transition
as interbank links increases. Next, Fig. (1)(d) confirms
again that the systemic risk in dynamical network ap-
proach decreases with 〈k〉.
For many parameter sets (〈k〉, Th, p, 1− fn) obtained
from each two-period runs (where τ > 2, thus no re-
covery), we perform linear regression analysis 1 − fn =
α + αpp+ αTTh + αkk, and obtain α = −0.016± 0.001,
αp = 2.20 ± 0.03, αT = 0.067 ± 0.005, and αk =
−0.0017 ± 0.0002. The systemic risk significantly in-
creases with p and Th, while decreases with degree 〈k〉.
Note that these values we obtained using p ∈ (0, 0.1),
Th ∈ (0.2, 0.8), and 〈k〉 ∈ (2, 20).
Dynamical network approach reveals one more fore-
casting benefit. It provides us with forecasting power
for generally any future time horizon. For the dynam-
ical Erdo˝s Renyi network I in Fig. (1)(b) we show the
expected systemic risk where each of 10,000 runs is com-
posed of four steps. If each time step represents, say
semi-year period, than two-step systemic risk represents
our estimation for systemic risk a year ahead, while four-
step systemic risk represents our estimation for systemic
risk two years ahead. As expected for the case with no re-
covery, four-step systemic risk is larger than two-step sys-
temic risk. Similar result we obtain in Fig. (1)(c) where
for 〈k〉 = 8 we show that four-step systemic risk is sub-
stantially larger than two-step systemic risk. Note that
these results we obtain under assumption that banks and
assets, once failed, do not recover. Clearly, in more reli-
able dynamical network approach one should also define
how assets and banks recover over time after, for exam-
ple, the government intervenes in the market.
Figure (2) shows that for fixed p and Th, the systemic
risk decreases with decreasing parameter p2 (shown from
1 to 0.6), that is a reasonable result since p2 = 1 im-
plies that a bank deteministicly fails when a criterion for
insolvency (1 − φt,i)A
B
i + A
M
t,i − L
B
i − Dt,i ≤ 0 is ful-
filled, while when p2 6= 1, there is some chance that the
bank will not fail. This unpredictability is something
that really occurs in real market, since bankruptcy is not
deterministic event. However, stochasticity is not im-
portant only at microscopic firm (bank) level. Ref. [23]
reported that introduction of stochasticity leads to emer-
gence of macroscopic phase-flipping between “active” and
“inactive” macroscopic phases that are demonstrated in
Ref. [24] for “expansion” and “recession” phases in econ-
omy.
In the previous network I it was assumed that each
bank can independently internally fail. Next we propose
another network model II (see Methods), where each
bank can put its money not only in other banks, as in I,
4but also in different illiquid asset classes AMt,i. Since dif-
ferent banks can invest their money in equal assets AMt,i,
banks’ failures are now not independent. In contrast to
banks’ failures, AMt,i’s failures are assumed to be indepen-
dent to each other. For simplicity, we define that firms
can affect banks, but not vice versa as in [9, 11, 26].
In the following simulations we include recovery pro-
cess. In II there are four time steps in our analysis, but
this time we change the time period needed for recov-
ery, τ . For (i)-(iii) ER dynamical network with finite
number of banks, Nb = 1000, and assets, Nf = 10, our
numerical simulations in Fig. (3)(a) confirm that the sys-
temic risk calculated for bank network—defined by the
fraction of banks in failure—increases with the individ-
ual probability of asset failure p, chosen to be equal for
each asset. We assume as in Ref. [11] that both large and
small banks hold the same number of asset classes, 10.
We perform 105 simulations in order to estimate expected
systemic risk where each simulation itself we perform in
four steps with τ meaning that once a bank or an asset is
failed, it stays failed for the entire period τ . Figures (3)
reveals that this dynamical network II exhibits highly
non-linear properties. By first fixing parameter Th, in
Fig. (3)(a) for II we find that the systemic risk for bank
network increases with τ . The longer time a bank stays
in failure, the larger the systemic risk. In Fig. (3)(b) we
show how dynamical approach enables us to estimate the
systemic risk for different time horizons. As expected,
with increasing the time horizon, the systemic risk also
increases.
In order to analyse how banks and assets interact
with each other over time, we evolve simultaneously both
banks and assets. In Fig. (4) we show how the fractions
of failed (Nf = 10) assets and (Nf = 1000) banks change
over time for a given set of parameters, where recovery
exists. Note how the periods when many assets are dys-
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FIG. 2: For fixed p and (b) Th, with decreasing parameter
p2 (from 1 to 0), the systemic risk decreases. We set 〈k〉 = 8
and Th = 0.5 in (a).
functional coincide with the periods when many banks
are dysfunctional, in agreement with our model assump-
tion that asset failures may affect bank failures in all
banks having investments in the failed assets.
Our network model II is partially motivated by Beale
et al [10]. As known in finance, each bank can re-
duce its probability of failure by diversifying its risk
[27]. However, when many banks diversify their risks
in similar way, the probability of multiple failure in-
creases [10]. For the case with N banks and M assets,
[10] defined the total loss incurred by bank i after one
period Yi =
∑
WijVj , where the failure occurs if its total
losses exceed a given threshold γi, i.e. Yi > γi. Here,
Wij denotes bank i
′s allocation in asset j, Vj is the loss
in asset j’s value taken from a student t distribution, and
γi is a threshold.
In model II we use not t distribution as in Ref. [10], but
a simpler Laplace distribution and derive a probability of
bank failure with two assets with allocationsW1 andW2:
P =
exp(− γ
W2τ
)
4(1 + W1
W2
)
+
exp(− γ
W2τ
)
4(1− W1
W2
)
(1− exp(−
(1− W1
W2
)γ
W1τ
))
+
exp(− γ
W1τ
)
2
+
exp( γ
W2τ
)
4(1 + W1
W2
)
exp(−
(1 + W1
W2
)γ
W1τ
).
This expression, numerically tested in Fig. (5), gives the
same smile-form for the probability of bank failure as
numerically found in Ref. [10]. Next we analyse how
diversification of asset allocations affects systemic risk
within the dynamical network approach. To this end,
Ref. [10] proposed a measure to estimate the level of asset
allocation
D =
1
2N(N − 1)
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
M∑
l=1
|Wi,l −Wj,l| (2)
in order to quantify the average of the distances between
each pair of banks’ asset allocations, where D = 0 if each
bank invests equally in each asset, thus if Wi,j = 1/M
for each i and j. Thus, when many banks decide to in-
vest with similar portfolios, they may increase the chance
to fail simultaneously. In Fig. (6)(a) within dynamical
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FIG. 3: (a) Systemic risk for bank network increases with
time spent in failure τ . (b) Systemic risk for different time
scales. With increasing the time horizon, the systemic risk
also increases.
5network approach, we obtain that the lowest systemic
risk occurs when all assets are equally distributed across
banks, that is in agreement with the result obtained in
Ref. [10] where banks do not affect each other, and sys-
temic risk is defined as expected number of failures. With
increasing randomness in asset allocation, where D in-
creases from zero to 1/3, the systemic risk also increases.
As a new result arising from the network approach, in
Fig. (6)(b) we obtain that the systemic risk decreases
with average degree 〈k〉 faster when asset allocation is
more homogeneous.
To see how well the real market can withstand sys-
temic risk, we exam the level of diversification of asset
allocation for the U.S. commercial banks. Here, based on
64,289 commercial banks’ balance sheet, we analyze their
loan allocations in 10 different sectors [28]: Loans for
Construction and Land Development Loans Secured by
farmland, Mortgages Secured by 1-4 Family residential
properties, Loans Secured by multifamily (> 5) residen-
tial properties, Loans Secured by nonfarm nonresidential
properties, Agricultural Loans, Held-to-Maturity securi-
ties, Commercial and industrial loans, others, Available-
for-sale securities, Loans to Individuals. The first five
sectors are under the asset class of Real Estate which is
the biggest part of the banks’ loans allocations. Hence
we decompose them to smaller sub-sectors. The data are
collected from 1/1/1976 - 12/31/2008 and a considerable
fraction of the banks have disappeared during the period.
We use Eq. (2) to calculate the average diversification of
the commercial banks, and find D = 0.51, a larger value
than D = 0.33, obtained for random diversification. It
indicates that in real market, diversification of banks puts
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FIG. 4: Dependence between (a) firms and (b) banks arises
from the dynamical network model where firm failures may
affect all banks having investments in those failed firms. We
set τ = 50, p = 0.004, p2 = 0.8, 〈k〉 = 4, and Th = 0.5. Peri-
ods characterized by the largest spikes in the fraction of failed
firms coincide with the spikes in the fraction of failed banks.
Both fractions of (a) failed assets and (b) failed banks are
increased where the fraction of failed banks are characterized
by three states, one with virtually no failed nodes, and two
states with different fractions of failed nodes.
the systems at a riskier regime than random diversifica-
tion.
DISCUSSION
Generally, the systemic risk risk may arise either be-
cause banks diversify their risks in firms in similar ways
[10] or because banks are linked within a bank network
and thus failures can spread contiguously[2–4]. For the
dynamical (time-dependent) network [23] where nodes
(i) inherently fail, (ii) contiguously fail, and (iii) re-
cover, when applied to finance, the stochastic contigu-
ous spreading controlled by parameter p2 corresponds to
a stochastic condition for the bank to be solvent (ac-
tive in network terms). We demonstrated how the sys-
temic risk in the dynamical (time-dependent) network
depends on dynamical network parameters: probability
of individual asset failure p, bank vulnerability parameter
Th, and average network degree 〈k〉. We found that the
more inactive banks each bank can sustain (Th closer to
zero), the smaller the systemic risk. For fixed p and Th,
the systemic risk decreases with decreasing parameter p2
(increasing stochasticity). This result is reasonable be-
cause when a criterion for a bank’s insolvency is met and
p2 6= 1, there is some chance that the bank will not fail.
In practice, the parameter Th can be controlled by the
government or banks. Our analysis showed that having
Th . 0.4 enables the system to function with low risk for
a large set of parameters p and 〈k〉. We demonstrated
how the dynamical network approach enables us to esti-
mate systemic risk for different future time scales. We
also showed how the systemic risk depends on the level
of asset allocation. The dynamical network approach en-
ables to estimate systemic risk in a wide range of finan-
cial systems from pension, mutual, and hedge funds to
banking system.
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6METHODS
We defined the network model I in Results and here we
explaine the model graphically. In Fig. (7)(a) we choose
τ = 2, Th = 0.5, and p2 = 1, where the last choice for
p2 implies that the solvency criterion is deterministic.
Due to dynamical time-dependent network approach, in
Fig. (7)(a) we see how different nodes become internally
failed at different times. Due to the choice for the value
of Th, the financial contigion is not spread to the nearest
hubs (note that a bank deterministically fails if it has less
than 100Th% active neighbours). In Fig. (7)(b) we choose
τ = 3 and p2 = 0.8 where the last choice for p2 implies
that the solvency criterion is now stochastic. Now we
choose the larger Th than in (a), Th = 0.8, meaning that
each bank is more dependent to failures of its neigbours
than in (a). Now we see in Fig. (7)(b) how the financial
spreading is more devastating then in case (a). Note that,
due to stochasticity in the solvency criterion, some nodes
which would be externally inactive due to deterministic
criterion in (a) are now in (b) externally active.
We define the network model II in the following:
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FIG. 6: Dependence of diversification of assets on systemic
risk within dynamical network approach. (a) Systemic risk
increases with Th for varying D value. D quantifies the level
of asset allocation. With increasing randomness in asset allo-
cation, where D increases from zero to 1/3, the systemic risk
increases. We use that p2 = 1 and Th = T
′
h (see Methods).
(b) Systemic risk decreases with average network degree 〈k〉.
(i) At each time t, each of Nf assets A
M
t,i can inde-
pendently fail where the probability p of failure for
each AMt,i is equal and is taken from a Laplace (dou-
ble) exponential distribution, L(x). We define that
asset AMt,i fails if the Laplace variable x is smaller
than some threshold, Ph—thus, p =
∫ Ph
−∞ dxL(x).
For simplicity, assets do not influence each other.
Once asset AMt,i fails, it stays in failure with no pos-
sibility for recovery.
(ii) Each of the Nb nodes representing banks, for sim-
plicity reason, has the same asset and liability val-
ues as in example in I—so, bank j at time t = 0
has ABj = kj , A
M
t=0,j = 0.6kj and Dj = 0.3kj (here
Dj does not change in time), but the results are
robust to different allocations. However, this time
the total illiquid asset AMt=0,j is allocated across Nf
assets. Precisely, at initial time t = 0 every bank
j determines how much money Wj,i to invest in
asset AMi , where Wj,i is taken randomly from the
homogeneous distribution after proper normaliza-
tion, where clearly for each j,
∑Nf
i=1Wj,i = A
M
t=0,j ,
where the sum runs over all assets. Since at each
moment assets can be either active or inactive
(failed), at each t, bank j has the total illiquid as-
set equal to AMt,j =
∑Nf
i=1Wj,iδi(t) ≤ A
M
0,j , where
δi(t) at time t can be either one or zero depending
whether asset AMi is active or inactive. The more
robust the bank, the larger the fraction of failed
assets the bank can sustain without getting failed.
Here we define that bank j’s node becomes inter-
nally contiguously failed due to links to assets if
AMt,j ≤ T
′
hA
M
t=0,j , where T
′
h is the given threshold.
Bank j internally fails if AMt,j − Dj < 0 and from
our choice for AMt=0,j = 0.6kj and Dj = 0.3kj the
failure occurs when T ′h = 0.5. We define bank node
j’s internal failure state by spin |sj〉.
(iii) In our financial network, a bank can fail either
due to illiquid asset’ failures or due to banks’ fail-
ures. Here the concept of a network is used to
model interbank lending and to study the phenom-
ena of financial stability and contagion [2–4]. At
initial time, banks create links among themselves
through exchanging deposits to insure themselves
against contagion [3]. To this end, external fail-
ure state of bank node j denoted by spin |Sj〉 is
|0〉 (during a time τ ′ = 1) with probability p2 if
less than 100 · Th % of j’s neighbouring links are
active [23]. Bank node j—described by the two-
spin state |si, Si〉—is active only if both spins are
1, i.e, |si, Si〉 = |1, 1〉. Links between banks are
bidirectional. Having two spins, representing a fi-
nancial health of a bank, assumes that a bank fails
either if it made bad investments in firms or in other
banks—alternatively if it is surrounded by bad
7neighbours. We assume AM0,j = 0.6kj, Dj = 0.3kj
(the same choices as in I), and ABj = kj . For this
choice of allocations, if we assume that all illiq-
uid assets where j invested are active, we obtain
Th = 0.7 (φh = 0.3) (see Eq. (1)). Suppose that at
time t some illiquid assets (20%) are inactive and
AMt,j =
∑Nf
i=1Wj,iδi(t) = 0.8A
M
0,j = 0.48kj. From
insolvency criterion (1−φt,i)A
B
i +A
M
t,i−L
B
i −Dt,i ≤
0 we obtain φt,i ≥ 0.18 ≡ φh. Hence, the larger the
fraction of inactive illiquid assets, the smaller the
fraction of neighbouring banks required to cause
the external failure.
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FIG. 7: Contiguous spread in model I. (a) Deterministic sol-
vency criterion (p2 = 1). For steps t = 0, 1, 2, and 3 shown is
a network for τ = 2. Active nodes are blue, internally inac-
tive nodes are red and externally inactive nodes are denoted
by orange. Nodes can become internally inactive at any mo-
ment where congigion is spread each step towards the nearest
neighbours. (b) Stochastic solvency criterion p2 6= 1). For
steps t = 0, 1, 2, and 3 shown is a network for τ = 3 and
p2 = 0.8.
